Reserve Board's apparent decision to relax monetary policy earlier this year. Such crises have been a recurrent theme since the mid-1960s, although definition of the term and prediction of the event have proved equally elusive. Corporate bankruptcies, failures in the thrift industry, problems at regional banks, and near-defaults on loans to foreign borrowers have created new concerns about the resiliency of the financial structure. The concerns are especially great because of the linkages between the health of the financial system and the growth of real economic activity.
Thus the problems seem to have been confined to a relatively fewalbeit large-companies. Interest rates on commercial paper of nonfinancial corporations moved up a few basis points in July 1970 as other market rates drifted lower, but preexisting spreads were reestablished the following month. Rates on finance paper initially showed a somewhat larger bulge, but by the end of the year, normal spreads were being restored. The banks that took up the loan demand of corporations that had been foreclosed from the paper market were likewise unaffected: CD rates also fell continuously through the second half of 1970, despite the lifting of regulation Q ceilings and the presumed riskiness of the new loans. A fairly substantial shift in the composition of assets was accomplished with virtually no disruption.
The difficulties of Chrysler Financial, Commercial Credit, and others may be traced to conditions peculiar to those firms and not to the overall financial situation. Before the Penn Central default the market may not have adequately assessed theirriskiness, while afterward the appropriate risk premiums were demanded. The 1969-70 period was not a serious The conventional wisdom is that only the largest and most creditworthy banks were able to roll over maturing CDs, and that this inability to raise funds caused a reduction in new loan commitments and intensified the ensuing recession. Yet the volume of jumbo CDs outstanding rose by $76 billion at a seasonally adjusted annual rate in 1974:2 and by $46 billion in 1974:3, compared with much smaller amounts in the preceding quarters. Net new bank lending continued to be positive through 1974:4. As the shocks of the Franklin National collapse were beginning to be felt, the Federal Reserve was once again called upon to step in. Banks managed to retain deposits on their own, however, by offering higher premiums on jumbo CDs. Nearly all of the $2.1 billion increase in discount-window borrowing between 1974:1 and 1974:3 went to Franklin National itself. Advances to Franklin National were $1.7 billion on October 8, 1974, when that obligation was assumed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). By year-end, total advances were well below the precrisis level.
The increased cost of funds to banks was passed through in the form of higher lending rates. The prime rate rose from 8/4 percent before the Franklin National crisis to 12 percent shortly after, roughly paralleling the change in the CD rate. For the prime rate this level represented a record spread over Treasury yields that was surpassed only when credit controls were imposed in 1980.
Clearly the entire banking system did not become much riskier in those few months. Nor does it seem plausible that investors were underestimating the risks to that great an extent before mid-1974. Moreover, yields retreated and spreads narrowed rapidly within a year. The aberration appears to have arisen from events within the financial system, and has the characteristics of a serious crisis as defined here. Corporations whose borrowing was linked to the prime rate paid premiums that had more to do with perceived risks in the banking system than with themselves. And, although the duration of the crisis was brief, these were real costs that contributed to reduced earnings and curtailed capital spending.
A major financial disruption more severe than anything experienced in the last thirty-five years would seem to require not only the preconditions of a crisis, but also lack of confidence by investors bordering on panic and an inability or unwillingness by the central bank to intervene effectively. These further conditions seem unlikely to be satisfied. Markets remained orderly during the two episodes described above, as indicated by the continuing volume of transactions. Moreover, there was every indication that the Federal Reserve was prepared for the problems that arose.
Present Financial Risks
The current period clearly qualifies as at least a financial crunch of the sort described by Sinai. Economic expansion has ended with the application of tight monetary policy. High real interest rates have combined with lower levels of real demand to cause serious cash-flow problems for businesses in several sectors.
The household sector has suffered declines in real income and a rise in unemployment. Spending has been curtailed, and loan repayments are beginning to lag. Although consumer loan delinquencies have remained level, recent experience with mortgage loans is less favorable. As of mid-1982, mortgage delinquencies as a share of loans outstanding were 60 percent above 1979 levels and foreclosures were up more than 40 percent.7 Interest income of financial corporations has been impaired somewhat as a result.
These trends have been cited as the incipience of a serious financial crisis. One cannot minimize the substantial dislocations that have occurred to corporations, households, and sovereign borrowers and, indirectly, to the banking system. Indeed, the repercussions on financial institutions may well represent the more serious set of problems.
The balance of this paper reviews conditions in several areas of the economy and argues that the financial system moved to the level of nascent crisis at some point in 1982. Evidence of crisis conditions are described and distinguished from other indicators of palpable, but nonfinancial, stress. The section concludes with a brief discussion of the role of the Federal Reserve System in preventing or ameliorating present financial crises.
NONFINANCIAL CORPORATE BUSINESS
The corporate sector is undergoing severe financial strains, but for the most part they are the result of depressed sales and lingering cost pressures. Through midyear, pre-tax profits of nonfinancial corporations have fallen by a third from their peak in the first quarter of 1981. Business failures have risen, in relative as well as absolute terms, to levels that rival the 1930-33 period. Real gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporations fell to an annual rate of $859 billion in 1982:1 from $883 billion a year earlier.
Because of high long-term interest rates, there has been a pronounced shift to short-term financing, leading to a greater sensitivity to market shocks. The "quick ratio" (financial assets to short-term liabilities) is at a historic low of 1.15, and short-term liabilities are 71 percent of total liabilities. These levels, however, have not changed very much in the 7. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, "National Delinquency Survey" (August 23, 1982), and previous issues. last two years. So, although interest payments consumed 39 percent of sector domestic income less employee compensation in 1982:2, an increase of 9 percent from a year earlier, substantial cash flow is still available to meet contractual obligations. These are aggregate data, of course, and many firms are in a much more tenuous position. But many types of spending can be and have been deferred. One cost of the current episode has thus been a loss of output arising from a diminished inclination to incur risks on the part of both borrowers and lenders. This is a manifestation of a crisis.
If corporate bankruptcies induce lenders to raise risk premiums, it may be a sign that new information has reached the market and proper allocative decisions are being made. For example, during 1982, ratings of many corporate bond issuers were reduced. In 1981 Moody's lowered ratings on fifty-three companies and raised them on thirty-three. As of September 30, 1982, the annualized rates have been one hundred fortyfour downgradings versus fifty-two upgradings.8 The mark of a crisis, however, would be higher risk premiums for bonds of healthy companies of a given quality-a widening of spreads between rates on corporate and Treasury bonds, for example. That would imply an increase in risk aversion, with risk premiums in excess of that required for actuarial soundness. Improper allocative decisions would result. Corporations that would have prospered, or at least survived, at the former lower level of rates (which they have merited) find themselves in greater difficulty when confronted with higher rates, thereby fulfilling the prophecy.
Bond rates for firms with less than the highest credit ratings have risen to stiff premiums over comparable issues of higher-rated corporations and the federal government, as shown in table 2. It is interesting that the spread of the Aaa rate over long-term Treasury bonds has declined even as the Baa-Aaa spread has widened over the past several years. This may suggest a relative scarcity of the higher-rated issues as institutional investors seek to abide by rules prescribing some minimum percentage of those securities regardless of yield differences. This widening of spreads for lower-grade issuers is imposing costs on new issuers. It is true that the flow of new long-term bonds is small-Baa companies now account for about 10 percent of new issues, and bonds represent less products of the financial system. The yield spread on Aaa bonds is above recent levels although still narrower than during the 1970-75 period. For bonds with lower rates, however, the spread is at an all-time high.'0 These are further indications of "crisis" as defined in the previous section.
MONEY MARKET MUTUAL FUNDS
Money market mutual funds are a relatively new instrument, but already they have enormous importance. Total shares outstanding reached $225 billion at the end of the third quarter of 1982, of which $181 billion was in noninstitutional funds.11 These accounts have grown extremely rapidly since 1979 and represent a major shift in the composition of household financial assets. For many, they have substituted for time and savings deposits (and, to a lesser extent, checkable deposits). The current crunch is the first to be encountered by the money funds, and it therefore seems appropriate to examine this industry's reaction to stress.
So far both managers and customers have prospered. Money market mutual funds enjoy an image of safety rivaling the insured depository institutions while they champion the cause of the small saver. But the very popularity of the funds-particularly to relatively unsophisticated investors-has raised questions: given the ease of withdrawals, the lack of deposit insurance, and their high visibility, is a "run" on the money funds possible? How likely is this to occur and what would the ramifications be?
One key indicator is the ability of a money fund's managers to maintain constant the net asset value of a share. This is accomplished through adroit control of default and interest rate risks.
The potential impact of defaults is minimized by purchasing highquality assets from diverse issuers. Funds typically have rigorous standards in these areas, selecting issues only from among the highest grades and avoiding undue concentration in a single issuer. Even if a Is there an impact on money markets from changes in the investment attitudes of money fund managers? It may be that money funds seek to preserve their image by quickly and visibly shifting purchases in accord-ance with perceived preferences and not necessarily in response to actual changes in risk and return. For example, it has been reported that the money funds stopped purchasing CDs from Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago after its losses in the Penn Square Bank episode came to light, even though other investors (notably other banks and overseas investors) continued to buy Continental Bank's paper at a small premium. '3 Commercial paper (including finance paper and bankers' acceptances) has always represented the largest single type of asset in money market mutual fund portfolios, with the share hovering around 40 percent. Indeed, the funds have become the largest purchasers of this paper, absorbing 72 percent of the net increase in 1981, as shown in table 4. Much of the growth in money fund holdings of commercial paper has paralleled a decline in household purchases, suggesting that many investors have simply shifted from direct purchases to use of the funds as intermediaries. Money funds plus households held 41 percent of commercial paper outstanding at the end of 1979 and hold 49 percent currently, although total paper outstanding grew during the period from $156 billion to $247 billion. Net new issues fell to a $31 billion annual rate in the first half of 1982, but because of the short maturities on these instruments (generally less than six months), the stock turns over several times a year. Now that 32 percent of outstanding paper is held by investors through money market mutual funds, does the intermediation process increase or decrease the chances of a crisis? Fewer individuals now control the decisions to roll over a larger share of outstanding paper, and they must meet the concerns of investors who can demand immediate redemption of shares. The secondary market for commercial paper is less well developed than for other money fund assets such as government securities and negotiable CDs. A decision by a few fund managers to invest elsewhere the proceeds from maturing open market paper could quickly spread to other funds. Such actions could introduce substantial shortrun disruptions as corporations seek alternative purchasers for their paper or different sources of financing.
The dollars taken out of paper would still be available for investment, either by money market mutual funds or by individual investors. A 13. Wall Street Journal, August 10, 1982. decision by the holders of funds to shift from commercial paper to bank certificates, for example, would permit a substitution by borrowers of bank loans for paper issues. The Federal Reserve would have to adjust reserves to accommodate this shift into reservable instruments, and the adjustment by borrowers and lenders would not be instantaneous, so some costs would be incurred. But none of this poses any special problems for financial markets or for the Federal Reserve. Unlike the nonfinancial corporate sector and the depository institutions to be discussed subsequently, there are no signs of trouble stemming from the money market mutual funds. In principle, the potential does exist, however, and emerging data may indicate that money fund investment decisions tend to amplify the distortions that arise elsewhere in the system. not arrest the deterioration in the industry's net worth. Operating losses will continue as the average cost of liabilities rises to market levels, indicating a continuation of involuntary mergers with financial assistance provided by the FSLIC. Implementation of title II of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which calls for additional expenditures by the FSLIC to ongoing firms, might be expected to increase the costs even further. But the agency has become increasingly resourceful in minimizing the reported expenses associated with its assistance programs. The FSLIC will issue interest-bearing securities to troubled institutions in exchange for income-capital certificates, debtequity hybrids that require interest (dividend) and principal payments only if net operating income is positive. Because these certificates will be carried by the FSLIC at book value, the transaction has no immediate effect on the agency's reported condition. The economic cost has increased but accounting costs have not. It now appears that no additional resources will be required as long as interest rates do not rise substantially and confidence in the regulators is maintained.
Government agencies have been successful so far in relieving the pressures on the thrift industry. There are indications, however, that the limits are being approached on FSLIC and FDIC merger assistance, Federal Home Loan Bank System lending, tax credits, purchase accounting in supervisory mergers, and the other techniques that have been used until now. Without the decline in short-term rates, the pace and cost of thrift institution failures might have overwhelmed the administrative, legal, and financial capabilities of the regulatory agencies. In the event of a widespread loss of confidence in the thrift institutions, the Federal Reserve System would be called upon to provide the liquidity to cover withdrawals; at that point, the Federal Reserve would find itself holding collateral of low liquidity and uncertain value, with little prospect of soon reversing the transactions. It may be that the Federal Reserve viewed its choices at midyear as being monetary ease then or later. It chose the more orderly approach, acting promptly.
INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND THE COMMERCIAL BANKS
Conditions in the United States concern other countries as well. Developing countries have been particularly hard hit by the reduced How well, then, are these countries coping with their debt? An indication can be gained from comparing export earnings with debt service. And whatever conclusions are to be drawn must also take account of recent policy actions that will improve or worsen the situation. South Korea's debt does not appear to be a problem. That nation has a growing economy with substantial export earnings, and it now enjoys a credit rating rivaling the most favored sovereign borrowers. Recent loans to Korea have carried interest rates slightly lower than the average for OECD borrowers.
The three large Latin American nations clearly present the major problems, both for international bank lending in particular and for the financial system in general. Mexico appears to be the biggest problem at the moment, but Brazil and Argentina also have difficulties and together their debt to U.S. banks exceeds that of Mexico.
The risks in Mexico were thought to be low because that country is an oil exporter. This source of strength faded with declines in the demand for and price of oil. Its trade deficit grew, inflation increased, and the currency was devalued. Mexico's interest payment burden was projected to be a high 34 percent of exports in 1982, with principal payments equal to 85 percent of exports falling due also.22 By late 1981, lenders began to demand higher interest rates. Eurodollar loans to Mexican sovereign borrowers carried a premium of 0.5 percentage point over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) early in 1981, but the rate increased to 1.5 points over LIBOR for the last new loans negotiated in 1982:2 (see figure 1 ). The few small medium-term credits issued in the third quarter carried premiums of 2 points over LIBOR. Finally, the government of Mexico announced that it would be unable to make timely payment of interest and principal on the outstanding bank loans, and it sought assistance from the U.S. government and international agencies.
A major concern has been the effect of the Mexican problems on the U.S. banks that hold $22 billion of those loans. Even if most or all the loans will ultimately be repaid, their present discounted value will be reduced, but by amounts that cannot be calculated with precision. The amounts will depend on current account dynamics, the amount of new infusions of capital and maturity extensions required, and actions by the oil-exporting cartel. This uncertainty is a major part of the problem. The 1974-75 recession exposed the financial system to enormous strains. Many observers believed that the eventual recovery was quite fortuitous. That earlier experience may indicate the limit to which the system can safely be pressed. It may be inferred that the warning signs observed in mid-1982 induced the Board to revise its stance. This suggests that the Federal Reserve views the efficiency of the financial system as its primary responsibility-its role as central banker. This is good news for those who fear the consequences of a financial crisis per se or who view the misallocations that result as too high a price to pay for the possible further moderation of inflation. It appears that monetary policy has been controlled so as to force the economy through a financial crunch into the early stages of a crisis. But that is as far as the Federal Reserve seems willing to go.
Comments and Discussion
Benjamin M. Friedman: I found the parts of Andrew Carron's paper that explained and documented what has been happening much more helpful than the attempts to develop categories for different degrees of financial problems and thereby to define a "financial crisis." I doubt that we will ever be able to draw such distinctions well. Carron makes as good an attempt as I have seen, but still the resulting definitions are not very satisfying.
I would like to discuss some of the paper's conclusions. I agree with Carron that the higher-risk premiums that we have seen on risky securities in the financial markets to date have had to do almost entirely with the discounting of risks associated with real phenomena. The markets are now realizing that our economy is simply not going to have a typical vigorous recovery from the current recession, and moreover that unemployed workers are not the only economic actors to be hurt in such a situation.
There was a long period during which participants in the market were apparently able to persuade themselves either that disinflation was going to be costless or that the only people who had to pay the costs were on the unemployment line. That view is now disappearing, and market participants are starting to understand something that Carron's paper brings out well: if the economy has a recession like the current one, which has been the worst yet in the postwar period from the perspective of business profits, and then does not follow it with a strong recovery, the resulting situation is ruinous for many firms.
Carron has documented the position of the thrift industry very well, and he has identified the basic problem: the FSLIC just does not have 419 enough capital to keep the thrift industry operating with its current structure intact.
I would therefore urge that bank mergers with thrift institutions be more actively encouraged as a way out of the present problems of the thrifts. The banking system provides an obvious pool of capital for this purpose. For banks want to enter diverse markets, especially across state lines, and it seems entirely in order to let them pay for that relaxation of currently prevailing restrictions. The way to let the banks do so is through assumptions of essentially failed thrift institutions. I see no reason to put the taypayers' money into saving the thrift institutions when banks are willing to put in their capital instead.
Finally, Carron appears more concerned than I would be about the prospect that banks with foreign loans would have to take losses on these loans. To some degree the banks have put themselves in this situation. Those banks that are at greatest risk are the ones that have been the most aggressive in asserting that these loans were not risky. In fact they were risky. These banks have not been putting aside adequate loan loss reserves and therefore have been overstating their earnings for years.
In some cases, it almost appears to be a deliberate policy on some banks' part to buy enough high-risk loans to convert them into zero-risk loans by creating a position in which the U.S. government will have to bail them out in the end.
My conclusion is that, although a situation in which banks fail should and can be avoided, we should not be determined to avoid losses to shareholders in banks that have pursued such policies. If some of these loans were written down as nonperforming, and banks therefore had to raise new capital at low equity prices, that would only reflect the true result of the lending policies they have chosen.
General Discussion
Robert Hall elaborated on the paper' s analysis of money market funds by pointing out their significant advantage compared with commercial banks in terms of financial crisis risks. According to Hall, the banking system is especially prone to crises because banks give depositors a face-value claim rather than an equity claim on the banks' assets. If banks gave equity claims, as funds do, there could be no question of the banks failing or become illiquid because of a few problem loans. Depositors would find that the value of their claims had declined as a result of the problems, but would have no temptation to withdraw all their assets immediately. Jeffrey Sachs replied that, even though bank failures as such would not be a problem, the system of international lending might not be more stable if depositors had equity stakes. He observed that the last great crisis in international credit markets occurred in 1931 when banks did not play a central role. Almost all foreign lending in that era was in the form of bonds, an asset much closer to current money market holdings than to bank deposits. Sachs argued that institutional bank lending in the international market has greatly enhanced the efficiency of international lending because, in the present era, banks can flexibly negotiate with creditors to reschedule debt payments. Debt rescheduling is sometimes tantamount to partial default, but is far less disruptive than the formal defaults and unilateral debt moratoria which were so common before 1930. James Tobin added that the present arrangement, at least since its reform in 1935, has not done that badly. It seems to perform well in the allocation of risk and maturity preference and in providing intermediation. Through this process banks create liquidity and safety that depositors want and need and that would be absent in a world of nothing but funds in which depositors are forced to bear equity risks.
Robert Solomon strongly disagreed with the suggestion in Benjamin Friedman's comment that large commercial banks with international problem loans should be compelled to pay all the losses associated with these loans. He disagreed with Friedman's premise that these loans were reckless, and argued instead that most of the present problem is attributable to unprecedentedly high real interest rates and the recession in the industrial countries-factors not under the control of either the large banks or their LDC customers and developments that were well beyond the range of normal expectations. He also argued that, if the large banks were compelled to reduce their international lending, the impact on the less developed countries and, in turn, on the industrial countries, would be severe.
Peter Kenen expanded on the current risk of a country defaulting in the international credit market. He argued that the risk of full default is quite small and that debt reschedulings do not normally affect the net worth of lenders. Bank examiners do not reclassify rescheduled loans as "nonperforming" for fear of adversely affecting the banks' capacity to participate in debt reschedulings. Kenen also remarked that banks currently have a great deal of indirect exposure to international risks. Banks that have not directly lent to Mexico or Poland, for example, may be indirectly affected by those countries' problems because of loans to banks in third countries that in turn have supplied credit to Mexico or Poland.
